Do corporations have equal rights with human beings?




Corporate personhood is a travesty of justice that must be eliminated before we can reestablish rule of law.  The primary reason most Americans live in absolute anarchy today is because the ignorant American public has been sold a bill of goods by corporate controlled law schools that claim corporations are “people.”  And I have a seaside resort in Switzerland that I want to sell you.

It is through the collusion of the entire legal profession that Americans have had their rights turned into privileges while corporations have created the illusion of being sentient with rights rather than being a convenient legal fiction with nothing more than privileges controlled by its charter.

This is precisely why, after studying the law for years on my own at the SMU Regional Law Library, I turned down going to SMU Law School for free when I worked in their Legal Department.  Through my Montessori style of self education, I discovered that the legal profession intentionally buys a bill of goods from corporate controlled law schools about what is constitutional law.  They do this because it appears the vast majority of those who attend law school really want nothing more than a license to practice billing and to hell with truth, justice, and the American Way.

Although state bars require lawyers to take 15 hours in ethics classes each year, this is an absolute joke.  Ethics is not something that can be taught.  Either you have it or you don’t.  Apparently, most of the American Bar Association doesn’t have ethics or we wouldn’t have law books loaded with unconstitutional laws [sic].

Rare is the lawyer who will challenge unconstitutional law because they know they will get black listed for doing so.  They will be attacked by the legal system itself for upsetting the apple cart.  Ask Van Irion of Knoxville, Tennessee who challenged the bastardization of the commerce clause or Jeffrey Dickstein, an Oklahoma lawyer who lost his shirt taking authenticated irrefutable evidence to the Supreme Court, proving beyond a doubt that the 16th Amendment was never ratified, only to be told by the treasonous Supreme Court that a district court can presume the government is correct and refuse to see the evidence in utter denial of due process of law.

When corporate boards of directors can kill with impunity, when controlling shareholders such as Bill Gates can publicly laugh about what a good job vaccines are doing with killing as many people as possible, then you no longer live under rule of law.

And so we wonder, how did this anarchy come about?

Although my discussion of corporate personhood may seem long winded, it is in fact a summary of my legal brief on the topic.  Particularly when legal interpretation is disputed, it is essential to go back to the beginning of American law to find the correct interpretation and then trace which subsequent cases erroneously relied on it so that they can be challenged and overruled.

The U.S. Supreme Court likes to pick and choose when it refers to the rights of corporations as opposed to the rights of human beings and that can be conveniently done when one no longer chooses to start at the beginning or even have any regard for rule of law.  It is pathetic that the Supreme Court already knows on the front end that a corporation is a fictional entity and, therefore, it cannot possibly be a person with human rights anymore than a teletubby is a human being.


The determining factor between corporations and human beings is that corporations do not have free will, but human beings do.  Merriam-Webster defines free will as (1) voluntary choice or decision and (2) freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention.[1]

The court continues to choose to interpret the 14th Amendment to include corporations as persons, despite the fact that they are not “born,” as is required by the 14th Amendment:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  U.S. Const., 14th Amend.

Corporations are neither “born” nor “naturalized” and therefore cannot be citizens.  They are created by human beings.  It is the human beings who create them that have “inalienable” or God given rights and not their creation.  Therefore it is corporation’s creators who are the citizens.  In The Venus, 12 U.S. 153 (1814), while Chief Justice Marshall concurred with the majority, he specified that:

“The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.”
 “The inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are strangers who are permitted to settle and stay in the country. Bound by their residence to the society, they are subject to the laws of the state while they reside there, and they are obliged to defend it because it grants them protection, though they do not participate in all the rights of citizens. They enjoy only the advantages which the laws or custom gives them. The perpetual inhabitants are those who have received the right of perpetual residence. These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages.”  Supra at 290 citing Vattel.

Despite all the evidence in early American law to the contrary, the 21st Century Supreme Court continues to bestow human attributes to organizations labeled as corporations as if they were persons, when nowhere in the law is it established that corporations have any of the attributes of someone who is born or who has free will.  According to the definition provided in The Venus, corporations more appropriately fit the description of “inhabitants” who are deemed inferior to natural born citizens “without participating in all its advantages.”

In Shank v. DuPont, 28 U.S. 242 (1830), Justice Story also cites the principles of citizenship enshrined in his definition of a “natural born citizen:”

. . . [C]hildren born in a country, continuing while under age in the family of the father, partake of his national character as a citizen of that country.[2] Supra at 245.

This principle was reaffirmed in Minor v. Hapersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167 (1875) and United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 661 (1898).  It is therefore undeniable that the unadulterated opinion of the court from the inception of this country and prior, in Blackstone’s Commentaries has been, is, and must continue to be that a citizen, as contemplated by the 14th Amendment, must be a person who was “born” and cannot be an artificial person, the latter clearly being the “inhabitant” contemplated in The Venus.

In the majority opinion rendered by Chief Justice Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), it appears the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution’s contract clause is conveniently misconstrued in later decisions and that that misconstruction is enhance by Justice Story in his concurring opinion in Dartmouth referring to the birth of a corporation by suggesting that its existence commences at the time that it is “in esse” which falsely claims that the corporation was born.

Chief Justice Marshall did not define a corporation in Dartmouth, as the opinion in this case is generally construed to stand for, but in fact defined that the contract clause of the Constitution pertains to the human beings underlying the corporation rather than the corporation itself.  It had already been established by Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) and it was actually confirmed in Dartmouth that the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to only address the rights of human beings, particularly since corporations are not explicitly addressed anywhere in the Constitution.  “It can require no argument to prove, that the circumstances of this case constitute a contract.”  Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra at 627.

Marshall was clarifying that the contract clause in the Constitution is with regard to the human beings who form the corporation’s charter and not with the corporation.  The Constitution pierces the corporate veil to assign the ability to contract to the underlying human beings, which is all the Constitution is concerned with.  Human beings must sign the contract for it to be legal; otherwise, just inscribing the name of the corporation would be enough to make it binding without the involvement of human beings.  Nowhere does the opinion explicitly state that a corporation can enter into a contract.  That is a presumption read into the opinion.  Marshall only confirms that the contract clause is between two individuals:  the state (the composite people of the state) and the individuals who enter into the contract called the corporate charter, which is why the case involved the Trustees and not just the college itself.  The college itself was, is, and always will be a fiction.

After further discussion of how the contract that forms the charter creates the fictional entity, the Court went on to say:  “On the first point, is has been argued, that the word ‘contract,’ in its broadest sense, would comprehend the political relations between the government and its citizens . . .”  Supra at 627

Here, the Court confirmed that the contract is between the government that grants the charter (which is representative of the sovereign people who formed the government) and the human beings behind the charter.  The Court recognizes that the contract exists between the government and “its citizens.”  As defined in The Venus and the subsequent related cases cited hereinabove, a citizen must be “born.”  Rather than define a corporation as a “person” or a “citizen,” the Court in Dartmouth, instead, limits its existence to a fiction that only exists on paper:

A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. . . By these means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular object, like one immortal being. But this being does not share in the civil government of the country, unless that be the purpose for which it was created. Its immortality no more confers on it political power, or a political character, than immortality would confer such power or character on a natural person. It is no more a state instrument, than a natural person exercising the same powers would be . . .  There can be no reason for implying in a charter, given for a valuable consideration, a power which is not only not expressed, but is in direct contradiction to its express stipulations.
From the fact, then, that a charter of incorporation has been granted, nothing can be inferred, which changes the character of the institution, or transfers to the government any new power over it. The character of civil institutions does not grow out of their incorporation, but out of the manner in which they are formed, and the objects for which they are created. Supra at 637-639.

The modern misconstruction of Dartmouth is further supported by the misuse of the Latin term “in esse” by Justice Story in his concurring opinion:

In respect to corporate franchises, they are, properly speaking, legal estates, vested in the corporation itself, as soon as it is in esse. They are not mere naked powers, granted to the corporation; but powers coupled with an interest. The property of the corporation rests upon the possession of its franchises; and whatever may be thought, as to the corporators, it cannot be denied, that the corporation itself has a legal interest in them. It may sue and be sued for them. Nay, more, this very right is one of its ordinary franchises.  Dartmouth supra at 701.

In Dartmouth, the court erred by applying the Latin term “in esse” to a corporation, as if it is a human being that is “born.”  Interpretation of this case by corporations, in order to assume the natural rights of human beings, requires misinterpretation of the language used:

IN ESSE. In being.  A thing [sic] in existence.  It is used in opposition to in posse.  A child in ventre sa mere is a thing in posse; after he is born, he is in esse.[3]

BIRTH. The act of being wholly brought into the world.  The whole body must be detached from that of the mother, in order to make the birth complete.[4]

THING.  An inanimate object distinguished from a living being.[5]

CORPORATION.  An organization formed with state governmental approval to act as an artificial person to carry on business (or other activities), which can sue or be sued.[6]

A “thing” cannot be “born” so the insertion of that sentence into the definition of “in esse” has to be a mistake or a devious attempt to alter the meaning.  It is completely out of context.

Two-hundred years of misinterpretation have led to a false belief that the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized corporations as having the same rights as natural human beings to contract and to enforce contracts when, in fact, Chief Justice Marshall clarified that there is no evidence in the Constitution that the framers ever intended to consider the rights [sic] of corporations.  Instead, he revealed that the contract clause actually pierces the corporate veil and looks to the contract between the individual human beings, in this case being the trustees of Dartmouth College and the government to form the fictional entity called Dartmouth College.  This piercing is evident because corporations are never mentioned in the Constitution and the intent of the framers is clearly established to only consider human beings.

This folly is enhanced by the ludicrous focus on a head note written by a court clerk falsely claiming that the court held that the 14th Amendment applies to corporations.  This is never said in the actual opinion of the Court in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).  That opinion has absolutely nothing to say about the “personhood” of a corporation, but it continues to be relied upon by stupid lawyers because of a false head note?  No lawyer or judge has seen fit to eradicate that false head note reference to the personhood [sic] of corporations, knowing that doing so leaves the door wide open to allow the utterly stupid to continue to rely on it.

Nor does either case cited in Santa Clara County recognize corporations as having the same rights as natural persons to contract and to enforce contracts, citing Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189 (1888), citing Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. 514, 560 (1830), which stated:

It has been settled that a contract entered into between a state and an individual is as fully protected by the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution as a contract between two individuals.  Supra at 560.

Providence Bank reaffirms Chief Justice Marshall’s repeated assurances that Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution only addresses contracts between human beings because the Constitution consistently fails to address corporations while consistently addressing the rights of human beings only.

And yet, this is what law schools teach that these cases stands for:
That a corporation is a person.
Show me where it says that in the law.
I have yet to find it.

From the time of Blackstone’s Commentaries, I find that a corporation is an “artificial person,” but nowhere does it say that a corporation is a natural person that is a citizen that is born with free will.

The legal definition of “individual” supports my contention that Chief Justice Marshall throughout his opinions over the years, beginning with Marbury v. Madison, consistently supports the intent of the framers to only address the rights of individual human beings and not the fictional entities that merely inhabit our country:

As a noun, this term denotes a single person as distinguished from a group or class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association ; but it is said that this restrictive signi- fication is not necessarily inherent in the word, and that it may, in proper cases, include artificial persons. See Bank of U. S. v. State, 12 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 400; State v. Bell Telephone Co.. 30 Ohio St. 310, 38 Am. Rep. 583; Pennsylvania it. Co. v. Canal Com’rs, 21 Pa. 20. As an adjective, “individual” means pertaining or belonging to, or characteristic of, one single person, either in opposition to a firm, association, or corporation, or considered in his relation thereto.[7]

The qualification inserted into this legal definition of the word “individual” is emphasized in the underlined references to state case law that provides dictum with no basis in precedent.  State case law cannot supersede the U.S. Supreme Court.  Again, someone stupidly allowed unconstitutional state case law to be used as legal citations to support the opposite of what the Supreme Court has already established, the idea being that not everyone reads carefully and some people just stupidly copy without thinking.

There is no law that establishes a corporation is a person.  Everything cited speaks to the contrary:

  • The framers of the Constitution only intended to address the rights of individuals as corporations are not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution.
  • Article I, Sec. 10 addresses contracts with individuals only and therefore any reference to a corporation’s ability to contract pierces the corporate veil.
  • The repeatedly expressed interpretation by Chief Justice Marshall on the intent of the framers to only address human rights, as well as the conferring of “individual” rights to a succession of “individuals” once again pierces the corporate veil.
  • The legal definition of “individual” addresses human beings.

Dicta from state cases had to be inserted into the legal definition of “individual” to presume that the definition of “individual” is “not necessarily inherent in the word.”  Well, not according to the Supreme Court in it’s early years, before the words of the court got twisted and misconstrued in order to assign human and natural rights to an artificial being with very limited purposes.

Those purposes conveniently exclude responsibility for crimes
that only the human beings who entered into the contract
can be held liable for.

In fact, the courts must continuously avoid piercing the corporate veil in order to define a corporation as a “person.”  For example, only the individuals who hide behind the corporate veil can be held criminally liable for a crime, so fining a corporation for criminal activity is a gross miscarriage of justice:

Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root in American soil. As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation.  Morissette V. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).

For a crime to exist, criminal intent must be established.  Corporations have no free will.  The individuals behind the corporate veil have free will.  Free will is necessary for criminal intent to exist.  To hold a corporation accountable for crimes, the corporate veil must be pierced.


Nowhere can evidence be found in the law that a corporation is a natural person.  It is not born, it cannot be a citizen, and it does not have free will.  Therefore, it cannot share the inalienable rights of its creator human beings.


That’s why Satan always fails to outshine the Lord.

In order to correct the massive corruption that is controlling the world today, we must pierce the corporate veil in every case of criminal wrongdoing by a corporation in order to hold the board of directors and controlling shareholders responsible for their crimes, not the corporation’s crimes.  A corporation is a fiction.  It cannot commit a crime.

And we don’t even have to reinvent the wheel to do it.  Germany already has a legal track record for sending boards of directors and controlling shareholders of publicly held corporations to prison for the crimes committed by the corporation.

When we start holding the criminals behind the corporate veil responsible for their crimes, only then will we be able to restore rule of law and make America great again.  Until then, we live under corporate tyranny imposed by those who cannot be held accountable for their crimes because of the false illusion that the corporate veil provides immunity from liability to the board of directors and shareholders.

Only humans can have rights.
Corporations can only have privileges.
Only humans can be held accountable for crimes
because corporations are an illusion.

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[2] This opinion prima facie establishes that the Kenyan spy in the oval office is a subject of the British Empire, once photographed bowing in obeisance to his liege.